(Phnom Penh): In international relations, countries are not equal in size, economic strength, military power or diplomatic influence. But when a dispute moves into the framework of international law, the central question is no longer simply: Which side is more powerful?

Instead, the question becomes: Which side has the stronger evidence, legal arguments and basis under international law?

This is one of the key implications of Cambodia’s decision to invoke compulsory conciliation under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, following Thailand’s unilateral termination of the 2001 Memorandum of Understanding, or MOU-2001.

For Cambodia, the hope does not lie in any assumption that UNCLOS guarantees a Cambodian victory. No legal process can guarantee an outcome before the evidence and arguments of both sides have been examined.

What UNCLOS can do, however, is shift the arena away from a contest based primarily on power and toward a structured process in which law, facts, maps, technical data and legal arguments are presented before an independent international commission.

For a smaller country, that shift can be significant.

Small and Large States May Be Unequal in Power, but They Are Sovereign Equals Under International Law

One of the foundational principles of the United Nations Charter is the sovereign equality of states.

Article 2 of the UN Charter provides that the organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members. It also requires states to settle their international disputes by peaceful means.

This does not mean Cambodia and Thailand possess equal economic resources, military capabilities or political influence.

It means that the size of a country or the strength of its military is not the legal standard for determining its maritime entitlements.

When it comes to delimiting an Exclusive Economic Zone, or EEZ, and the continental shelf, Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS provide that delimitation between states with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law in order to achieve an “equitable solution.”

International courts and tribunals have similarly approached maritime delimitation through legal principles aimed at achieving an equitable result — not by awarding an advantage to whichever state possesses greater political, economic or military power.

This is where Cambodia can find reason for confidence.

On the legal playing field, the decisive question is not which side possesses more weapons. It is which arguments can withstand scrutiny under international law and which claims are better supported by facts and evidence.

Ending MOU-2001 Did Not Make the Dispute — or the Parties’ Legal Rights — Disappear

Thailand’s termination of MOU-2001 may have ended one bilateral framework for negotiations, but it did not make the underlying maritime dispute disappear.

Thailand itself stated that, following the termination of the MOU, it intended to pursue new discussions based on international law and the principles of UNCLOS.

After Cambodia submitted its formal notification initiating compulsory conciliation, Thailand filed an official response on June 19, 2026, appointed its agent and conciliators, and stated that it was prepared to participate in the proceedings in good faith and in accordance with its international obligations.

That development is significant.

Cambodia and Thailand may continue to disagree over the reasons for terminating MOU-2001 and over important questions of law. But the two sides are now engaged in a process whose structure is provided by UNCLOS.

The dispute has therefore moved beyond a bilateral framework that had become deadlocked and into a process involving an international Conciliation Commission tasked with examining the issues and helping the parties search for a peaceful settlement.

“Legal Equality” Does Not Mean Cambodia or Thailand Has an Advantage in Advance

To say that UNCLOS provides a structured legal forum does not mean that the Conciliation Commission will presume that Cambodia is right or that Thailand is wrong.

The Commission must hear both sides, examine their claims and objections, and assist them in exploring possible solutions.

Nor are the Commission’s final conclusions and recommendations equivalent to a binding court judgment.

This means that, from this point forward, the most valuable “weapons” for either side are not military ones. They are the quality of the evidence, the consistency of the legal arguments, the strength of the technical data and the ability to demonstrate that a proposed solution is consistent with UNCLOS and the principle of equity.

For Cambodia, therefore, the opportunity offered by UNCLOS is not a shortcut to victory. It is an opportunity to have its case tested in a rules-based process in which legal reasoning and evidence matter.

If Cambodia Has a Strong Legal Case, Could Thailand Use Force to Disrupt the Process?

This is a question that can understandably generate concern, but it is important to distinguish between a political pretext and a lawful basis for the use of force.

Under international law, believing that a state is losing ground in negotiations or in a legal process does not provide a lawful basis for attacking another state.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state, while Article 2(3) requires international disputes to be settled by peaceful means.

The principal basis recognized under the United Nations Charter for a state to use force on its own authority is the right of self-defense under Article 51 when an armed attack occurs. Another circumstance is the use of force authorized by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. Therefore, losing ground at the legal table cannot, by itself, become a lawful justification for war.

And if a state were to resort to force without a lawful basis, that would not erase the underlying legal questions surrounding the maritime boundary. Instead, it could create additional questions of international law and state responsibility on top of the original dispute.

Timor-Leste Shows Why Smaller States Need Not Lose Hope

The experience of Timor-Leste and Australia provides an important example of what compulsory conciliation can offer when two countries possess markedly different levels of power.

In 2016, Timor-Leste initiated compulsory conciliation under UNCLOS in an effort to resolve its maritime boundary dispute with Australia.

The process did not end with the dispute being sent to court.

Instead, the Conciliation Commission helped the parties continue negotiations, narrow their differences and search for mutually acceptable ground. Ultimately, in 2018, Timor-Leste and Australia signed a treaty establishing their maritime boundaries.

The case illustrates an important point: the primary purpose of compulsory conciliation is not to produce a winner and a loser through litigation. It is to create a structured pathway through which states with conflicting positions can return to negotiations and seek agreement.

The Timor-Leste–Australia case does not guarantee that Cambodia and Thailand will achieve the same outcome. Every maritime dispute involves different facts, legal positions, national interests and political circumstances.

But the broader lesson remains relevant: an imbalance of power does not mean that a smaller state has no legal path forward.

When bilateral negotiations become deadlocked, an international mechanism can provide a different arena — one in which the parties must engage through law, evidence and negotiation.

For Cambodia, the Timor-Leste experience therefore offers a useful lesson: a smaller state does not need to possess the same power as a larger state in order to have a path toward settlement. What matters is having a legal avenue, strong evidence and the capacity to use that mechanism effectively to turn deadlock into an opportunity for agreement.

Conclusion

So, can UNCLOS transform a smaller state’s relative weakness in power into equality before the law?

The answer requires an important distinction: UNCLOS cannot make Cambodia and Thailand equal in military, economic or political power. But it can shift the arena from power toward law, evidence and legal argument.

Cambodia should neither lose hope nor regard compulsory conciliation as a guarantee of victory. Being the smaller country does not mean that Cambodia has no path forward.

What matters now is building strong evidence, developing coherent legal arguments, and keeping the dispute on a legal and peaceful track.

Put simply: International law does not guarantee victory to either a small or a large state. But it provides a legal playing field where no country—regardless of its military or economic power—can determine the outcome on its own.